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The MFA consists of bilateral quotas against  expense of restricted countries. The MFA
textile and clothing exports from developing  affects the pattern of trade.
countries. It thus derogates two GATr prin-
ciples:  nondiscrimination and the avoidance of  *  Since the MFA puts a cap on the quantity
quantitative restrictions.  Despite this deroga-  (not the value) of shipments, it encourages the
tion, the MFA is administered under the aus-  upgrading of goods.
pices of GAIT.
The MFA also has an impact on the eco-
The primary purpose of the MFA is to  nomic development in the long run. On the
restrict LDC shipments of textiles and clothing.  positive side, attempts to evade MFA quotas
Although the MFA quotas cost the consumer in  stimulate foreign investment from restricted
importing countries a great deal, they save (or  suppliers, like Hong Kong, to nonrestricted
create) few jobs.  The quotas are therefore a  countries. Investrnents to less restricted regions
poor way to protect workers from foreign com-  have helped economic developnent  of countries
petition.  in Asia (and perhaps to less extent in Latin
America and the Caribbean).
The MFA has a strong impact on LDCs in
the short ni  for the following reasons:  But the MFA discourages countries from
becoming "too successful."  For example, when
- The forgone expor. revenue of LDCs, partly  Bangladesh showed success in clothing exports
offset by the transfer of quota rents, is huge.  with the help of a Korean company, the devel-
oped countries negotiated bilateral restrictions
= Since individual quotas under the MFA are  with the poorer country. Thus the MFA tends to
imposed or selected (often efficient) exporting  maintain the present configuration of textile and
countries, unrestricted (inefficient) countries  clothing trade - and therefore discourages
may be able to increase their shipments at the  dynamic shifts in trade based on comparative
advantage.
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1. Introduction
The  textile  and  clothing  (T&C)  industry  has  often  played  a very
important  role  in  economic  development;  production  can  be  started  with
relatively  small  amounts  of  capital  and  preat  numbers  of  workers  with  low
wages  and  skills.  1/ As Park  and  Ande'von  (1988)  mentioned,  T&C  products  are
"typically  among  the  first  items  produced  and  exported  by a  newly
industrializing  economy  as  it  begins  to  diversify  away  from  primary
production."  Historically,  the  T&C  industry  contributed  a  great  deal  to  the
early  stages  of industrialization  of  many  countries,  including  the  UK,  the  US,
and  Japan. Nowadays,  T&C  products  are  leading  manufacturing  items  in  domestic
production  and  exports  in  Dminy  developing  countries.
In spite  of (or  perhaps  because  of)  its  importance  to  developing
countries,  international  ttade  of  T&C  products  has  been  for  many  years  subject
to  various  trade  reistrictions.  As early  as 1935,  Japan  announced  (or  more
precisely,  was  forced  to  announce)  the  voluntary  export  restraint  (VEt)  on
textile  exports  to  the  United  States.  2/ While  various  arrangements  have  been
made  toward  trade  liberalization  since  World  War  II,  T&C  trade  has  constituted
an  exception  to  the  general  CATT  rule. Ever  since  1961,  when  the  Short-Term
Arrangement  regarding  International  Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles  (STA)  was
adopted,  special  arrangements  have  been  made  for  international  trade  of TSC.
The  product  coverage  of restrictions  on  TSC  trade  was  dramatically  extended  to
1/ There  is  an important  exception  co  this  general  statement.  As  will  be
discussed  later,  it  is  often  pointed  out  that,  since  the  production  of
man-made  fibre  is fairly  capital  intensive,  developed  countries  have
recently  regained  comparative  advantage  in  the  production  of textile
products.
2/  For  details  of  the  Japanese  VER  in 1935,  see  Coto  (1988),  for  example.2
include  man-made  fibres  and  wool  when  the  Arrangement  Regarding  International
Trade  in  Textiles,  better  known  as  the  Multifibre  Arrangement  (MPA),  was
adopted  in  1973. The  MPA  has  been  renewed  three  times;  the  current  MPA  IV
runs  until  July  1991.
Because  of  the  importance  of the  T&C  trade  and  the  everlasting  nature
of  the  restrictions  on  4t,  the  MPA  has  had  a  strong  impact  on  both  importing
and  exporting  countries.  For  example,  the  MPA  negatively  affects  consumers  in
importinig  countries  through  the  price  increases  iu  both  domestic  and  imported
T&C products.  The  MPA  also  affects  the  exporting  countries  through  the
decline  of  their  export  opportunity.  While  the  loss  from  such  decline  is
partly  offset  by  the  "quota  rent,"  many  studies  have  fi  hat  the  revenue  of
exporting  LDCs  lost  due  to  the  restrictions  is  substantial.  Purther,  in
addition  to the  short-run  impact  mentioned  above,  the  MPA  also  have  various
dynamic  effects  on  economic  development.  On the  one  hand,  the  MPA  contributes
to  the  economic  development  of  unrestricted  or  less  restricted  LDCs,  which  are
often  poorer  than  restricted  major  T&C  exporting  LDCs,  because  the  MPA
sometimes  encourages  toreign  investment  in  less  restricted  LDCs. On  the  other
hand,  the  MFA  has  a  negative  impact  on  economic  development  because  the
process  of  the  dynamic  division  of labor  through  the  shift  in  comparative
advantage  is  delayed  by the  MPA:  becuame  of the  rent  revenue,  the  relatively
high  wage  countries,  such  as  Hong  Kong,  can  maintain  the  position  of  major
producer  of  labor-intensive  goods  like  clothing;  as  soon  as  a poorer  LDC,  like
Bangladesh,  begins  to show  signs  of success  in  exporting  of  T&C  products,  the
importing  countries  discourage  such  efforts  by  imposing  MPA  quotas  on  its
exports.3
Since  the  MPA  restrictions  have  a significant  impact  on  world  T&C
trade,  many  studies  have  been  carried  out  on them. But  the  subject  is  so
complicated  that  it  is  not  an easy  task  to  understand  its  various  effects
through  reading  vast  amounts  of literature.  In  view  of this,  the  purpose  of
this  survey  paper  is  to  review  the  major  findings  of  existing  studies  on  the
MPA's  -ffect,  with  emphasis  on the  effects  on LDCs,  and  to  suggest  the
directions  for  further  studies  that  are  needed  for  a  better  understanding  of
the  MFA. The  structure  of the  paper  is  as  follows.  In the  next  section,
dominant  features  of  the  T&C  exports  from  the  LDCs  will  be  examined. In
section  3,  the  essence  of  the  MFA  provisions  and  their  actual  development  will
be briefly  summarized.  These  two  sections  are  intended  to  provide  a
background  for  the  discussion  in  the  later  part  of  the  paper. In section  4,
studies  on the  effects  of the  MFA  on importing  countries  will  be  surveyed.
Although  the  focus  of this  paper  is  the  impact  on  exporting  LDCs,  the  effects
on importing  countries,  too,  are  briefly  surveyed.  This  is  because  quite  a
few  studies  are  available  on  cost  to  consumers,  domestic  employment,  profits
etc.  in importing  countries,  and  because  development  in  the  importing  country
affects  the  exporting  country. In  section  5, the  effects  of  the  MFA  on
export;ng  LDCs  will  be  discussed.  In  addition  to  the  short-run  impact  on
them,  the  dynamic  effect  on the  economic  development  is  also  discussed.
Finally,  in section  6,  a sua_ry and  conclusions  will  be  given  as  well  as the
directions  for  further  studies  needed  on  the  subject.4
2.  T&C  Exports  from  the  LDCs  and  Restrictions  on  Them  - An Overview
(1)  Dramatic  Expansion  of Clothing  Exports
The  world  trade  of  textiles  and  clothing  in  1986  amounted  to  more
than  $110  billion,  or 9  percent  of  total  manufacturing  trade. Since  clothing
is  relatively  labor-intensive,  developing  countries  have  shown  comparative
advantage  in  their  production.  This  is  evident  in  Table  1. By 1986,  their
share  in  the  world  T&C  exports  was  almost  50  percent,  while  their  share  in  the
world  manufacturing  exports  was  only  17  percent.  Especially  the  LDCs  show
strong  competitiveness  in  clothing  exports,  and  their  share  of  the  world
clothing  exports  was  more  than  60  percent.
Prom  1976  to 1986  the  growth  rate  of clothing  exports  from  LDCs  far
exceeded  the  growth  rate  of their  manufacturing  exports. It  is  noteworthy
that  during  this  period  the  growth  rate  of  T&C  exports  from  the  LDCs  as a
whole  was  substantially  lower  than  that  of  manufacturing  exports.  This  was
partly  because  of the  MPA  restrictions  on  T&C  exports  and  partly  because  of
the  shift  of  LDC  exports  toward  capital  intensive  products  such  as  consumer
electronics  and  machinery.
TABLE  1: Share  of LDC  Exports  in  World  Exports
)
1976  1980  1986
Textiles  and  Clothing  32.2  40.6  49.2
Textiles  26.0  30.0  33.9
Clothing  43.1  57.7  63.4
Manufacturing  9.4 j  13.2  16.6
Source: United  Nations  Trade  Statistics.S
While  LDCs play  a  very  important  role  in  the  world  T&C trade,  4&C
exports  are  very  important  to  the  LDCs because  the  share  of  the  T&C
(especially  clothing) in the  LDC manufacturing  exports is very large.  As
shown in  Table 2, more than a que  ;  of LDC manufacturing  ezt-rts  consisted
of textiles  and clothing,  which is j  times  higher than the  w..rld  average.  It
should  be noted that  the growth rate  of LDC textile  exports  was  much slower
than  clothing exports.  As often  pointed  out, 1/ developed  countries  have
regained,  to some extent, their  relative  strength in  the production  of
textiles (in the narrower sense),  as  textile  production  has become  more and
more capital-intensive  following  technological  development  in the industry.
Technological  progress  has been much slower  in clothing  production,  which is
still relatively  labor-intensive. Therefore,  the share  of textile  exports in
LDC manufacturing  declined substantially,  while that  of clothing  continuously
increased.  In view of this difference,  it is important  to distinguish  the two
when we discuss the T&C exports from  LDCs.
TABLE 2:  Share  of T&C Exports  in  Manufacturing  Exports
1976  1980  1986
World Exports
Textiles and Clothing  9.4  9.1  9.1
Textiles  5.9  5.0  4.4
Clothing  3.5  4.1  4.7
LDC Exports
Textiles  and  Clothing  32.2  27.9  27.9
Textiles  16.2  11.4  9.0
Clothing  16.0  16.5  18.9
Source: United  Nations  Trade  Statistics.
1/  See GATT (1984)  for  example.6
Remarkable  differences  between  textiles  and  clothing  are  also  found
in  the  destinations  of  these  exports  from  the  developing  countries.  As shown
in  Table  3, almost  all  clothing  exports,  but  only  half  textile  exports  go to
developed  countries.  As Keesing  and  Wolf (1980)  argue,  this  heavy  dependence
of  the  LDC  clothing  industry  on the  DC  market  is  partly  because  there  is  very
little  demand  for  factory  ude clothing  in  developing  countries  and  partly
becuase  most  LDCs  impose  strong  import  restrictions  on  clothing. Given  this,
the  MPA  restrictions  imposed  by developed  countries  have  all  the  more  damaging
effect  on developing  countries'  clothing  exports.
TABLE  3:  T  & C Exports  from  LDCs  by Destination
Destination  1965  1973  1978  1983
(Textiles)
Developed  Countries  58.2  62.3  51.6  49.9
Developing  Countries  41.8  37.7  48.4  50.1
(Clothing)
Developed  Countries  79.3  90.0  85.8  87.3
Developing  Countries  20.7  10.0  14.2  12.7
Note:  Eastern  Europe  and  USSR  are  not  included.
Source: Compiled  from  data  in the  ILO  (1987),  p. 11.
Although  many  developing  countries  are  exporting  clothing  to
developed  countries,  the  majority  of  shipments  come  from  a few  Asian
exporters,  i.e.  Hong  Kong,  Korea and  Taiwan  (Province  of  China). Table  4
clearly  shows  this  concentration,  and  it  suggests  a  more  interesting
phenomenon.  While  the  share  of  the  largest  thr2e  in  LDC clothing  exports
declined,  those  of  China  and  other  Asian  countries  increased  during  1973-84.7
In  particular,  the  expansion  of Chinese  clothing  exports  is  remarkable.  As
discussed  in  detail  later  in  section  5  of this  paper,  several  factors  seem  to
be  working  in  this  share  changet  (i)  the  shift  in  comparative  advantage  in
labor-intensive  clothing  production  from  more  developed  (high-wage)  LDCs  to
loss  developed  (low-wage)  LDCs,  just  as  Japan  lost  its  comparative  advantage
in favor  of the  Asian  Big  Three,  i.e.  Hong  Kong,  Korea,  and  Taiwan  (Province
of  China),  some  decades  ago;  (ii)  the  shift  in  clothing  exports  from  the  more
restricted  Asian  Big  Three  toward  other  less  restricted  LDCs becuase  of the
aiscridinstory  nature  of  the  MPA  restrictions.
TABLE  4:  Clothing  Imports  into  the  OECD  from  Selected  LDC  Exporters
(Share,  X)
Textiles  Clothinl
Destination  1973  1984  1973  1984
Asian  Big  Three  (1)  29.3  26.8  67.7  61.1
China  11.6  17.8  2.6  8.7
Other  Asia  (2)  29.2  22.4  7.7  13.4
Latin  America  and
the  Caribbemn  (3)  7.2  9.2  2.7  3.2
Other  (4)  22.7  23.8  19.2  13.6
Total  of  Above  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Note: (1)  Hong  Kong,  South  Korea,  Taiwan  (Province  of  China)
(2)  Bangladesh,  India,  Indonesia,  Pakistan,  Philippines,
Sri  Lanka,  Thailand
(3)  Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Dominican  Republic,
Haiti,  Peru  Uruguay
(4)  Greece,  Protugal,  Spain,  Turkey,  Yugoslavia
Source:  Cline  (19B7),p.  141.
(2)  Restrictions  on  T&C Exports
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  dramatic  growth  of  clothing  exports  from
the  LDCs  occurred  in  spite  of  a  high  level  of  both  tariffs  and non-tariff8
barriers.  Table  5 shows  the  average  tariff  rates  ;mposed  by  major  importers
of  T&C. The  post-Tokyo  round  tariff  rate  on  T&C  is  almost  three  times  higher
than  that  on  manufactured  goods  as  a  whole. Purther,  during  the  Tokyo  round,
T&C  tariffs  were  not  reduced  as much  as the  tariff  rates  on  manufactured
products.
The  tariff  rates  on  T&C  products  tend  to increase  acc3rding  to the
stae of  processing.  While  the  average  tariff  rate  of fibers  imposed  by  major
importers  a  around  one  percent,  that  of  clothing  is  often  more  th#  'O
percent. The  clothing  tariff  rates  of  Austria  and  Finland  are  espe.ially  high
(Table  6).
TABLE  5:  Pre-Tokyo  Round  and  Post-Tokyo  Round  Tariff
(Weighted  Average,  Z)
T&C_Manufacturins
Pre  Post  Pre  Post
USA  23.5  19  7  5
Canada  24  21.5  13.5  8.5
Japan  14  11.5  10  5.5
EC  15  11.5  8.5  6
Austria  30.5  30  14.5  12.5
Finland  30  29  7.5  6
Sweden  13  12.5  6  4.5
Switzerland  10.5  8.5  3.5  2.5
Simple  average
of the  above  20.1  17.9  8.8  6.3
Source:  Compiled  from  the  data  in  the  GATT  (1984),  p.  68.9
TABLE  6:  MPN  Tariff  Levels  for  T & C
(Weighted  Average,  S)
Fibres  Yarns  Fabrics  Clothing
USA  3.5  9  11.5  22.5
Canada  3  13  21.5  24
Japan  0.5  6.5  9.5  14
eC  0.5  7  10.5  13.5
Austria  0  7  23.5  37
Finland  0.5  6.5  28.5  39
Sweden  0.5  7.5  13  14
Switzerland  0  3.5  8&S  11
Simple  average
the  above  1.1  7.5  15.8  21.9
Source:  GATT  (1984),  p.  69.
In  addition  to  tariffso  non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  are  widely  imposed
on LDC T&C  exports.  Table  I  shows that  the  percentage  of  T&C  imports  subject
to  NTBs is  two  to three  times  that  for  manufactured  imports  as  a  whole. T&C
imports  from  LDCs  are  more  likely  to  be subject  to  NTBs  than  those  from
developed  countries,  which  is  becuase  the  MPA  restrictions  are  imposed  only  on
low  cost  suppliers  (i.e.  LDCs).
TABLE  7s  Percentage  of Imports  Subject  to  NTBs,  1983
(Weighed  Average,  X)
Textiles  and  Clothing  Manufacturing
Total  I From  DC  1 From  LDC  Total  I  From  DC  From  LDC
bSA  57.0  31.1  64.0  17.1  16.5  18.6
ECC  52.0  15.6  68.9  18.7  15.2  29.9
Japan  11.8  11.0  13.0  7.7  9.7  4.4
Source:  Nogu6s,  Olechowski  and Winters  (1986)10
2.  The  Nature  ind  History  of  the  MPA
(1)  The  MPA  and  the  GATT  Principles
Loosely  speaking,  the  MPA  consists  of  a system  of  bilateral  quotas
against  T&C  exports  from  developing  countries.  1/ Although  the  product
coverage  and  minor  details  are  different,  the  basic  idea  of the  MPA is
essentially  .he  same  ts those  of its  predecessors,  the  Short-Term  Arrangement
Regarding  International  Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles  (STA,  1961-62)  and  the  Long-
Term  Arrangement  Regarding  international  Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles  (LTA,  1962-
73). These  international  agreements  allow  contracted  parties  to  impose
quantitative  restrictions  in  order  to  avoid  "market  disruption."  The  concept
of  market  disruption  in  the  MPA  appeared  as  early  as in  1960  when  the  GATT's
contracting  parties  met  to  discuss  the  US proposal  on  a possible  international
agreement  to  restrict  T&C  trade. As  agreed  in  1960,  the  concept  consists  of
three  major  components:  (f)  a sharp  and  substantial  increase  of particular
products  from  particular  sources;  (ii)  the  products  brought  into  at prices
substantially  below  the  prevailing  prices  in  the  importing  country;  (iii)
serious  injury  to  domestic  producers  or threet  thereof.  Of the  three
components,  probably  (ii)  is  the  sost  important.  As Sampson  (1986)  pointed
out,  "in  this  manner,  low-cost  suppliers  (that  is,  developing  countries)  can
be selectively  singled  out  for  restraint  --  only  they  can  cause  market
disruption  as it is  defined  by  the  MFA."
As many  authors,  including  Choi  (1985),  Keesing  and  Wolf (1980),  and
Sampson  (1986),  pointed  out,  because  the  MPA  provides  for  a framework  of
quantitative  restrictions  against  T&C  exports  from  the  developing  countries,
1/  For  more  detail  of  tha  MPA  provisions,  see  Appendix.11
the  basic  idea  of the  MPA  (as  well  as  of the  STA  and  the  LTA)  is  a derogation
of OATi  principles;  non-discrimination  and  avoidance  of quantitative
restrictions  except  for  special  cases. It  is interesting  to  note  that,  in
spite  of such  a  derogation  of the  GATT  rules,  the  MFA  is  administered  under
the  auspices  of  GATT  and  is  documented  by the  GATT's  contracting  parties. In
this  sense,  the  MPA  presents  a rather  peculiar  case  of  trade  restrictions.
Then,  why  did  T&C  industry  in  importing  countries  succeed  in  getting
such  exceptional  protection  as the  MFA? Several  authors,  including  Keesing
and  Wolf  (1980)  and  Sampson  (1986),  speculate  as  to  the  origin  of the  MPA.
The  answer  seems  to  lie  in  a series  of  developments  in  the  cotton  industry  and
in the  international  trade  of cotton  products  in  the  1950s  and  early  1960s
because  the  basic  idea  of the  MPA  mentioned  above  was  first  incorporated  into
the  STA  in 1961,  whose  coverage  was  cotton  products.
As  many  authros  agree,  the  United  States  pl4yed  a decisive  role  in
the  establishment  of  the  STA,  and  therfore  developments  in  the  US cotton
industry  is  very  important.  It  should  be  noted  that  by the  1950s,  the  US
textile  industry  succeeded  in  obtaining,  at least  to some  extent,  the  support
for  protection  against  imports  of  cotton  textiles.  Keesing  and  Wolf (1980)
note  that
"..*  two  important  ideas  (were)  especially  strongly  held  in the  United
States,  namely  (i)  that  textiles  were  somehow  special  and  fully
deserving  of exemption  from  general  liberalization  and  (ii),  a closely
related  idea,  that  without  protection  the  industry  could  hardly
survive..."l
Keesing  and  Wolf  point  out  that  there  are  both  economic  and  political  reasons
for  such  special  attention  to  the  US  textile  industry.  First  of  all,  in  those
years,  output  and  employment  in  the  US textile  industry  were  stagnant  and  even
declining. It  is  noteworthy  that,  while  the  stagnant  situation  could  be,  in12
part,  attributed  to international  competition  caused  by the  shift  in
comparative  advantage  toward  low-wage  countries,  the  main  reason  for  that  was
a stagnant  demand  for  textile  products. In  the  United  States,  for  example,
the  share  of  textiLe  products  in  personal  consumption  expenditure  fell  from  14
percent  in 1919  to  less  than  9  percent  in  1959.  1/  In  addition  to  sucn  an
economic  reason  as stagnant  output  and  employment,  the  political  reasons  were
also  very  important:  (i)  the  industry  was  so  large  that  it  employed  17  percent
of total  manufacturing  employment  in  developed  countries;  (ii)  the  industry
was  well  organized  as a political  pressure  group;  (iii)  the  only  countries
affected  adversely  by the  protection  were  Japan  and  LDCs,  whose  political
clout  was  weak  in  those  days.
Such  a  protectionist  5dea  was  reinforced  when  Japan  applied  for
accession  to  GATT  in 1955. Many  countries  worried  about  the  potential  of
Japan,  which  was  dramatically  expauJing  the  exports  of  cotton  textiles.  And,
as Sampson  (1986)  argues,  "restraining  all  suppliers  would  require  restraint
of  more  economically  powerful  countries  and  could  prompt  retaliatory  action  or
requests  for  compensation  as  provided  for  in  Article  XIX  of GATT." Therefore,
the  United  States,  which  was  a  major  importer  of  Japanese  cotton  products,
negotiated  and  succeeded  in  obtaining  in  1957  an  agreement  on the  Japanese
five-year  VER  on the  shipment  of  cotton  textiles  to  the  US.  Although  the  US
succeeded  in  curbing  Japanese  cotton  products,  other  Asian  countries,  most
notably  Hong  Kong,  dramatically  increased  shipments  to  fill  the  gap,  as Table
8 shows.
1/ Keesing  and  Wolf  (1980),  p8.13
TABLE  8: Shipient  of Cotton  to the  US
($  million)
1956  1961
Total  154.3  203.3
Japan  84.1  69.4
Hong  Kong  0.7  72.0
Other  Asian
Countries  15.3  25.0
Other  54.2  36.9
Source: Hunsberger  (1964)
Such  a  diversion  of sources  of  imports  is  particularly  common  for  T&C
products,  because  the  setup  cost  of production  is  relatively  smell. Paced
with  such  a  diversion,  the  United  States  started  negotiating  with  Hong  Kong  on
the  VER,  in  vain,  and  it  brought  the  issue  to  GATT  in  an  attempt  to  obtain  a
multinational  framework  for  the  restriction  on  T&C  products.  Meanwhile,  the
UK  formed  bilateral  agreements  with  Hong  Kong,  India  and  Pakistan  on the
VER.
As  mentioned  earlier,  such  VERs  are  derogation  of  GATT  principles,
because  they  are  discriminatory  and  quantitative  restrictions,  and  therefore,
the  restricting  countries,  especially  the  US,  wanted  to  obtain  international
sanction  for  such  restrictions.  At  the  same  time,  exporting  countries  also
have  a  reason  to  agree  on  an  international  arrangement  because,  as  Keesing  and
Wolf  argues,  "it  was  feared  that  uncontrolled  restrictions,  even  if  agreed  on
a  'voluntary'  basis,  would  fundamentally  impair  the  long-term  opportunities  of14
developing  countries."  While  the  MFA  (as  well  as the  STA  and  the  LTA)
provides  that  the  new  quota  level  is  not  lower  than  actual  shipment  before
theimposition  of the  quota  1/,  the  level  of the  VER  before  1960  was  often
substantially  below  the  actual  shipments  of the  previous  year.
Thus,  the  interests  of  the  importing  and  exporting  countries,  to some
extent,  coincided,  and  the  international  agreement  on restrictions  on  T&C
trade  came  into  effect  in  1961. As men-made  fibre  and  wool  became  important
by  early  1970s,  the  pro.duct  coverage  was  expanded  to  include  such  fibres  when
the  zPA  started  in  1974. In  spite  of the  expansion  of product  coverage  and
other  changes,  the  basic  concepts  of  the  MFA  were  the  same  as agreed  in the
early  1960s,  as discussed  above.
(2)  Actual  Development  of the  MFA  Resttictions
Since  the  MlA  gives  only  a framework  of  world  T&C  trade  and  actual
restrictions  are  given  by either  unilateral  or bilateral  quotas,  the  degree  of
severity  of  MPA  restrictions  depends  on the  actual  administration  of
individual  quotas. Most  studies  agree  that  MFA  restrictions  have  become  more
comprehensive  and  more  severe  over  time  because  of  the  tougher  attitude  of the
importing  countries.
As the  GATT  (1984)  pointed  out,  MFA  I  (January  1974-December  1977)
can  be  characterized  as the  period  of  "re'lative  liberalization"  of trade  in
textiles  and  clothing.  During  this  period,  many  previous  restrictions  were
abolished,  consistent  with  MFA  Article  2 (phasing  out  of pre-MFA
restrictions).  Not  only  had  cotton  textiles  been  previously  subject  to
1/  See  Appendix  for  detail.15
restrictions  under  the  STA  and  LTA  since  1961,  but  also  there  existed  a  number
of  trade  restraints  on  wool  and  man-made  fiber  products.  Therefore,  the
period  of  MPA  I  "witnessed  enhanced  discipline  in  the  regulatory  measures
compared  to  the  autonomous  and  arbitrary  methods  of  the  past".  1/ Secondly,
the  restrictions  imposed  during  MlA  I  were  more  or  less  consistent  with  the
spirit  of  the  MPA  text.  Most  importing  countries  preferred  highly  selective
coverage  of  items  in  which  they  faced  or  anticipated  certain  problems,
(cons:lstent  with  Annex  A of  the  MFA)  rather  than  comprehensive  restrictions;
only  the  United  States  took  comprehensive  measures.  Further,  provisions  of
Annex  B  on  the  base  level,  growth  rate,  and  flexibility  2/  were  relatively
well  observed  by many  importing  countries.
MFA  II  (January  1978-December  1981)  proved  much  more  restrictive,
mainly  because  of  the  SC initiatives.  During  the  period  of  the  MPA  I,  the
eC's  T&C  imports  draaetically  increased,  possibly  because  the  T&C  exports  from
LDCs  shifted  to  the  EC  from  the  United  States,  where  a comprehensive  system  of
bilateral  restriction  had  been  established  in  1971.  This  increase  occurred
during  a  period  of  economic  recession  and high  rates  of  unemployment after  the
first  Oil  Crisis.  Thus,  while  most  of  the  MPA  participants  favored  a  simple
extension  of  the  MPA,  the  EC  took  a  very  hard  line.  Because  of  the  EC  a  new
provision  was  included  in  the  Protocol  of  Extension;  the  possibility  of
"Jointly  agreed  reasonable  departures"  from  particular  elements  in  particular
cases.  Although  "reasonable  departures"  are  only  to  be  temporary,  they  have
been  used  for  very  long  periods  of  time  indeed.  The  departures  consisted  of
reductions  in  quotas  compared  to  their  previous  levels  (or  actual  trade),
1/ GATT  (1984),  p.78.
2/ Se.  Appendix  for  details.16
reductions  in flexibility,  and  growth  rates  below  6 percent.  1/ During  this
period  the  EC formed  a system  of  comprehensive  restrictions,  dividing FPA
products  into  114  categories  and  five  groups. Further,  the  EC  adopted  a
"basket  extractor"  mechanism  whereby  any  exporter  whose  exports  exceeded  a
threshold  share  of total  EC  imports  would  be subject  to  new  controls.
Faced  with  the  growing  objections  of  exporting  countries  to  the
frequent  use  of "departures"  under  MFA  II,  the  Protocol  for  MFA III  (January
1982-July  1986)  did  not  contain  the  "reasonable  departures"  clause. Instead,
* re  specific  provisions  were introduced.  One  of the  most  important  was  an
"anti-surge"  provision  concerning  under-utilized  quotas. As will  be  discussed
in  detail  in  section  5 below,  most  of the  MFA  quotas  are  unfilled  except  for
those  imposed  on  a few  superstars  of  T&C  exports.  The  utilization  ratio  of
other  countries  is  sometimes  as low  as  10-20  percent. In  view  of this,
importing  countries  added  "anti-surge"  provisions  to  avoid  "surges"  of imports
under  unfilled  quotas. To  facilitate  adjustment  in  importing  countries,  a
permanent  Sub-Comittee  of  the  Textiles  Coimittee  was  established  to  monitor
adjustment  policies. In  spite  of these  changes,  MFA  III  led  to  a further
tightening  of restrictions.  In  December  1983,  the  Textiles  Surveillance  Body
reported  as follows  on the  implementation  of  MFA  III:
"...  on the  basis  of  notifications  reviewed  in  1982  and  1983,  the  overall
picture  is  one  of  a  somewhat  more  severe  implementation  of  the  Arrangement
since  the  coming  into  force  of  the  1981  Protocol  of  Extension:
-- unilateral  measures  have  been  taken  more  frequently;
-- a number  of  new  bilateral  agreements  with  previously  unrestricted
countries  had  been  concluded;
-- coverage  in  term of products  under  restraint  has  increased;
1/  As  described  in  Appendix,  the  MPA  text  provides  that  the  annual  growth
rate  of  continuing  quotas  should  not  be  less  than  6  percent.17
--agreements  concluded  with  large  suppliers  are  again  more  and  more
restrictive."
Faced  with  dramatic  import  increases  in  the  1980s,  the  United  States
became  more  and  more  restrictive.  The  most  important  change  in  the  US policy
was  a "call"  system,  announced  in  December  1983. Under  this  new  trigger
system,  the  consideration  of  a  possible  case  of  market  disruption  can  be
started  when:
(i)  imports  reached  at  least  20  percent  of  production  ;
(ii)  imports  have  risen  by 30  percent  in  the  previous  12  months  and
imports  from  an  individual  supplier  reached  1  percent  of  production.
The  US invited  more  than  a  hnndred  consultations  calls  in  1984-85,
and  in  almost  all  cases  new  restrictions  were  imposed  on  T&C  exports  from
developing  countries.  On the  other  hand,  the  EC's  policies  toward  T&C  exports
from  the  LDCs  in  the  period  of  MPA  III  was  less  severe  than  those  under  MFA
:I. The  EC did  not  invoke  the  "anti-surge"  provision  during  MPA  III,  and  the
"basket  eztractor"  mechanism  was  invoked  less  frequently.
During  MFA  IV  (August  1986-July  1991),  provisions  for  even  broader
coverage  and  stricter  restrictions  were  introduced.  The  "reasonable
departure"  clause  was  restored,  the  product  coverage  was  extended  to  cover
vegetable  fibers  and  silk  blends,  and  other  small  changes  were  made  to  further
restrict  the  T&C  exports.
The  MPA  has  now  been  in  effect  for  many  years,  and  that  there  are  far
prospects  for  abolishment  after  MPA  IV  ends,  although  negotiations  on the
future  of the  MPA  are  being  made  under  the  Uruguay  Round. Because  of the
everlasting  nature  the  MFA,  it  has  various  effects,  including  a  dynamic  impact18
in  the  long  run,  on LDCs  and  their  economic  development,  as discussed  in
detail  in section  5.
4.  Effects  of the  MPA  on  Importing  Countries
In  addition  to institutional  and  historical  studies,  many  analyses  on
the  effects  of the  MPA  have  been  published.  Most  deal  with  the  effects  on
importing  countries,  especially  the  cost  to  consumers  in  importing  countries;
very  few  analyze  the  effects  on  exporting  developing  countries.  Although  the
major  concern  of  the  paper  is  the  effects  of  the  MPA  on  esporting  LDCs,  major
studies  on  the  effects  of the  MPA  (and  other  restrictions  on  T&C  trade)  on
importing  countries  are  briefly  examined,  because  deveLopments  in  the
importing  country  affect  the  exporting  developing  countries.  While  policy
makers  in  importing  countries  have  tried  to  justify  various  MFA  restrictions
by saying  that  such  import  restrictions  are  necessary  to  protect  domestic
industry  and  workers,  most  researchers  have  revealed  that  import  restrictions
tend  to hurt  not  only  exporting  countries  but  also  importing  countries  as
well.
(1)  Cost  to Consumers  and  Domestic  Job  Creation
A  number  of studies  which  examine  MPA's  cost  to  consumers  also
consider  domestic  job  creation  due  to import  quotas. Most  studies  seem  to
agree  that,  although  the  consumers  in importing  countries  incurred  huge  costs
from  the  MPA  quotas,  the  number  of  domestic  jobs  saved  or  created  by  the
quotas  are  relatively  small,  and  therefore,  that  MPA  quotas  are  a poor  way  to
protect  workers  from  foreign  competition.
Studies  on the  cost  to  consumers  have  been  done  by,  to  name  a few,
Cline  (1987),  Hufbauer  et al.  (1984),  Tarr  and  Morkre  (1984)  for  the  US19
market;  Jenkins  (1980)  for  the  Canadian  market;  and  Spinanger  (1986)  for  the
German  market.  Of  course,  the  methods  of  these  (and  other)  studies  differ  in
many  respects:  (i)  type  of  restrictions  (e.g.  quota  only,  or  quota  and
tariff);  (ii)  coverage  of  exporters  (e.g.,  all  foreign  suppliers  or  Hong  Kong
alone);  (iii)  product  coverage;  (iv)  underlying  assumption  on  elasticities,
etc.
In  spite  of  this  variation,  the  basic  framework  of  their  analyses
seem.  to  be  the  same.  Figure  1  shows  a  simple  exposition  of  such  a
framework.  SS  is  the  foreign  supply  curve,  which  is  normally  depicted  as  a
horizontal  line  because  infinite  elasticity  of  the  foreign  supply  is
assumed.  But,  the  following  argument  also  holds  for  the  upward-sloping  supply
curve.  Under  free  trade,  equilibrium  is  obtained  at  C,  where  quantity  Qp  is
supplied  at  the  price  of  Pp. When  a  quota  is  imposed  to  limit  the  imports  at
the  amount  of  QR'  there  is  an  excess  demand  for  imports  at  the  price  of  Pp,
and  the  price  has  to  be  increased  to  eliminate  such  excess  demand.  The  new
equilibrium  is  obtained  at  A,  where  quantity  QR is  supplied  at  the  price  of
PR. Rectangular  PRPpBA  represents  "quota  rent."  This  quota  rent  is  usually
assumed  to  be  transferred  to  exporting  countries  because  the  MFA  quota  is
administered  by  the  exporting  countries.  1/ In  addition  to  this  quota  rent,
consumers  incur  another  loss  from  the  restrictions,  triangular  ABC,  which  is
often  called  a  "dead  weight"  loss,  because  it  is  lost  (i.e.,  cannot  be
captured  by  either  consumers  or  producers).  Note  that  total  consumer  costs
due  to  a  protection  should  be  adjusted  according  to  the  changed  consumer
surplus  in  the  market  of  domestically-produced  T&C.
1/ But  this  assumption  is  not  necessarily  warranted  in  many  cases,  because
when  the  importers  have  some  market  power,  the  quota  rents  are,  at  least
in  part,  captured  by  importers.- 20  -
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Namely,  the  protection  also  affects  the  price  of domestically-produced  T&C
because  domestic  T&C  is  an  (imperfect)  substitute  of  the  foreign  T&C.
Based  on this  approach  the  above  studies  reported  various  consumers
costs  to  importing  countries.  The  estimated  costs  from  some  major  studies  are
listed  in  Table  8.  While  estimated  values  of the  consumer  costs  differ
depending  on  coverage  and  underlying  assumptions,  the  magnitude  of  cost  to
consumers  coming  from  restriction,  on  T&C  imports  is  large.
Many studies  also  estimate  how  many  domestic  jobs  are  created  or
saved  by such  restrictions.  Their  estimation  technique  is  straightforward.
First,  the  value  of the  increased  domestic  production,  which  is  dependent  on,
among  others, the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  domestic  and  imported
products,  is  estimated.  Second,  the  average  value  of  domestic  shipments  per
worker  is calculated.  Then,  the  number  of jobs  created  is  calculated  by
dividing  changed  production  by  average  production  per  worker. As  Table  9
shows,  the  jobs  created  are  relatively  small,  and  the  cost  to consumers  per
job  saved  is  $42,000-57,000,  which  far  exceeds  the  average  wage  of  T&C  workers
in the  US.  Further,  it  should  be  noted  that  consumers  incur  this  cost  every
year  as long  as the  restrictions  continue,  while  the  displaced  workers  might
be  able  to  find  new  jobs  elsewhere  over  time.
(2) Profits  and  Income  Distribution
In  addition  to the  cost  to  consumers,  and  job  creation,  some  studies
exanined  other  effects  of  the  MFA  on importing  countries.  Since  our  major
concern  is  the  effects  on exporting  (developing)  countries,  only  two  aspects
of  these  other  effects,  i.e.  profits  and  income  distribution  among  workers,
will  be briefly  examined.22
TABLE  9:  Effects  of  Protection  on TUC  tupoWts
|Cine  Hufbauer  Tarr  & Morkro  Jenkins  Spinanger
Year  195  1964  1983  1979  MFA II  PerIod
Coverage  US TIC  US  TIC  US lports  Canadian  erman  TIC
lpo#ts  lop@ts  of  S"lected  clothing  Imports
clothing  from  Imports
Hong  Kong
Method  of  tariffs  tariffs  tariffs
protection  and quotas  and quotas  quotas  and quotas  quotan
Consumer  cost  $20.3  blI.  S27 bil.  $0.38  - 0.5  aii.  $400 mil.  DM  600_700
oili.  pe
year
Job created
434,200  640,000  9,000  _  _
Cost  per  Job
saved  $47,000  S42,000  142,000-57,000
Source: See  bibliography.
MPA  restrictions  have  a substantial  impact  on  the  profit  of domestic
producers  in  the  importing  country;  because  of import  restrictions  they  can
sell  more  products  at  higher  prices  at  the  sacrifice  of foreign  suppliers.
For  example,  Jenkins  (1980)  reported  that  as a  result  of  tariffs  and  quotas
imposed  on  T&C  imports,  domestic  producers  in  Canada  gained  by  US$240  million
in 1979,  equivalent  to  about  half  the  cost  to consumers.
Cline  (1987)  presented  an interesting  study  on the  income
distribution  effect  of the  MPA, As  he  mentioned,  one  of  the  arguments  in
favor  of protection  is  that  the  T&C industry  often  employs  relatively  low-wage
workers;  thus  protection  might  encourage  more  equitable  income  distribution
through  increased  .3mployment  of these  relatively  low-wage  earners. In  order23
to  test  the  validity  of these  arguments,  Cline  estimated  the  impact  on five
income  groups. He compared  the  cost  to  each  income  group  of the  increased
prices  of TNC  with  the  benefits  to  each  group  due  to  the  increased  employment
and  the  increased  transfers  to  producers.  Contrary  to  popular  belief,  the
cost  of the  price  increase  exceeded  the  benefit  for  all  income  groups  except
for  the  top  20 percent,  Thus,  the  protection  on  T&C  imports  worsens  the
income  distribution  rather  than  improves  it,  and  the  rationale  for
protectionism  becomes  even  weaker.
S.  Effects  of the  MFA  on  Developing  Countries
While any  studies  have  been  done  on the  effects  of the  MPA  on  major
importing  countries,  studies  on :he  effects  on  exporters  are  relatively
scarce. But  this  scarcity  does  not  mean  that  the  MPA  has  an  insignificant
impact  on exporting  developing  countries.  Rather,  because  the  MFA  is intended
to impose  discriminatory  restrictions  on the  exports  from  developing
countrics,  and  because  the  MPA  seems  to  continue  forever,  it  has  a strong
impact  on  developi-g  countries  both  in  the  short  run  and  in the  long  run.
First  of  all,  the  MFA  has  a direct  impact  on restricted  exporters,
that  is,  foregone  export  revenue  partly  offset  by the  transfer  of  quota  rents,
because  the  primary  purpose  of the  MPA  is  to  restrict  LDC  shipment  of  TIC
products. Second,  the  MFA  affects  the  trade  pattern;  since  individual  quotas
under  the  MFA  are  imposed  on selected  (often  effiLient)  exporting  countries,
unrestricted  (inefficient)  countries  may  be  able  to  increase  their  shipments
at the  expense  of restricted  countries.  Third,  since  the  MPA  put  a cap  on the
quantity  (not  the  value)  of shipment,  it  encourages  the  upgrading  of
shipments.24
In  addition  to these  immediate  effects,  the  MPA  gives  dynamic  impact
on :conomic  development  in  the  long  run  because  it  has  been  in  effect  for  many
years  and  there  are  no  signs  of its  imminent  demise. For  example,  it is  often
pointed  out  that  foreign  investments  from  restricted  suppliers,  like  Hong
Kong,  have  been  greatly  stimulated  by the  desire  to  evade  MFA  quotas.
Apparently,  such  investments  to less  restricted  regions  have  helped  economic
development  of  countries  in  Asia  (and,  perhaps  to lesser  extent,  in  Latin
America  and  Caribbean).
In  the  following  discussion,  I  will  review  existing  studies  on  how
and  to  what  extent  the  MPA  affects  developing  countries,  and  will  discuss  a
possible  direction  for  future  researches  needed. Unfortunately,  however,  the
only  areas  intensively  studied  are  "lost  shipment"  and  "accrued  rent"  due  to
restrictions.  On the  other  effects  mentioned  above,  there  have  been  very  few,
if  any,  studies  that  present  a theoretical  framework,  let  alone  a quantitative
estimate  of the  magnitude  of such  effects.
F1)  oregone  Exports  and  Rent  Transfer
Since  analysis  of  the  foregone  eAports  and  acquired  rent  of  the
exporting  country  is  the  other  side  of the  coin  of  the  cost  to  consumers  in
tne  importing  county,  quite  a few  studies  are  available  on them. The
framework  of the  analysis  of  foregone  exports  and  accrued  rent  in  the
exporting  country  is  essentially  the  same  as  that  in  Section  4-(l)  above.
In  Figure  1,  the  value  of  the  export  shipment  before  the  quota  is  the
area  PpOQpC  while  that  after  the  quota  is  the  area  PROQ  A.  Therefore,  total
decline  in  export  revenue  is  the  difference  between  the  two. In  other  words,
it is  the  value  of  lost  shipments  due  to  quantity  decrease  (BQRQpC)  less  the
rent  transferred  (PRPpBA).  Theoretically,  the  value  of shipmeats  may  decrease
or increase  depending  on the  elasticities  of  the  demand  and  supply.  The  more25
elastic  the  demand,  the  more  likely  the  value  of  shipments  is  decreased  by  the
restriction.  But  in  reality,  empirical  studies  agree  that  ezport  revenue
decreases  after  the  MFA  quota.
Empirical  studiee  have  found  that  the  magnitude  of foregone  exports
by  exporting  developing  countries  is  substantial.  For  example,  UNCTAD  (1986)
reported  that  if  all  restrictions  on  T&C  trade  (both  tariffs  and  NTBs)  were
removed,  T&C  exports  from  the  LDCs  to the  eC, Japan  and  the  US  would  increase
by  $15  billion,  an increase  almost  equal  to the  actual  level  of exports  (96
percent).  Further,  out  of  this  96  percent  increase,  60 percent  (about  two-
thirds)  could  be  attributed  to  the  removal  of  NTBs,  of  which  the  MPA
restrictions  are  by far  the  most  important.  Similarly,  Kirmani  (1984)
reported  in  an IMP  Staff  Paper  that  the  removal  of  both  tariff  and  nontariff
barriers  would  increase  LDC  exports  to  the  main  OECD  countries  by 82  percent
for  textiles  and  93 percent  for  clothing.  Whalley  (1988),  using  his  general
equilibrium  approech,  estimated  that  the  LDCs  as  an  aggregate  are  losing
around  $11  billion  from  the  MPA  because  the  valties  of foregone  shipments  due
to  quantity  decline  ezceeds  the  transferred  rent  by  that  amount.
There  are  also  some  estimates  on the  transferred  quota  rent  to the
ezporting  developing  country. Most  studies  on  the  cost  to consumers  in  the
importing  country  deal  with  the  quota  rent. Virtually  all  studies  assume  that
quota  rent  is  transferred  to  the  exporting  country  because  the  MPA  quota  is
administered  by the  exporting  countries.  Using  such  an  assumption,  Tarr  and
Morkre  (1984)  reported  that  the  rent  transferred  to  Hong  Kong  from  the  US
restrictions  on certain  T&C  items  amounted  to  $218.3  million,  or  one-half  to
two-thirds  the  cost  to  US  consumers.  Similarly,  Hamilton  (1986)  estimated  the
quota  rent  accrued  to  Hong  Kong  by  the  price  of  auctioned  quota  rights.
According  to  his  estimate,  Hong  Kong  acquired  as  luota  rent  $100-200  million
dollars  per  year  from  shipmnts  to  the  EC in  1981-83  and  $130-410  million  per26
year  from  shipment  to the  US in 1982-84.  Such  rent  income  amounts  to  0.7-1.7
percent  of  Hong  Kong's  GDP,  and  a little  more  than  10  percent  of  the  value
added  in  Hong  Kong's  apparel  industry.  Pelzman  (1988)  estimated  tariff
equivalency  of quota  rents  of  many  categories  of  the  T&C  products. Based  on
the  estimates,  he reported  that  the  amount  of the  transferred  quota  rent  from
the  US  to exporting  countries  is  "in  the  millions."
While  many  studies  cited  above  agree  that  the  quota  rent  is  huge,  it
is  much  smaller  than  the  value  of foregone  exports. Balassa  and  Michalopoulos
(1985),  for  example,  reported  that  the  value  of lost  shipment  due  to  quantity
decline  exceeds  the  quota  rent  nine  times  in  the  US  and  seven  times  in  the
EC.  Purther,  if  we  assum the  rent-sharing  between  exporters  and  importers,
the  ratio  of  quota  rent  transferred  to  LDCs would  become  even  smaller.  The
assumption  of  total  transfer  of  quota  rents  to  the  exporting  country  may  be
questioned.  Tarr  and  Morkre  simply  assert  that  "the  rents  are  transferred
from  the  US to  Hong Kong and,  therefore,  are  a  deadweight  loss  to  the  US.
Individuals  in  Hong Kong obtain  the  rents  because...Hong  Kong a4ministers  the
quotas."  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  a  total  transfer  of  quota  rents
holds  only  when  the  exporter  has  a  monopoly  power  and  each  importer  is  too
small  to  affect  the  market.  It  may be  more  usual,  however,  to  find  the
reversal  of  this  condition.  In  many cases,  big  buyers,  e.g.  Sears  and
Roebuck,  deal  with  small  producers  in  the  LDCs.  In  such  cases,  some of  the
quota  rents  would  be  captured  by the  importers  in the  developed  country;  the
incom  of  the  LDCs  from  quota  rents  might  not  as  large  as  the  existing  studies
suggest.  Further  research  is  clearly  needed  on  the  amount  of  quota  rents
captured  by  exporting  LDCs.27
(2)  Trade  Diversion  in the  Short  Run
In addition  to  the  foregone  exports  and  rent  transfers,  the  MPA
affects  trade  patterns.  Since  the  MPA  consists  of  discriminatory  quotas,  it
can  bring  about  trade  diversion  from  more  restricted  countries  to  less
restricted  countries.  As  Keesing  and  Wolf  (0980),  for  example,  pointed  out,
such  trade  diversion  occurs  in  favor  of  the  exports  from  developed  countries
because  the  MPA  restrictions  are  applied  only  to  developing  countries.  But,
such  diversion  occurs  even  among  developing  countries  because  developing
countries  are  not  equally  restricted.
While  the  number  of  member  countries  of  the  MPA  is  very  large  (42
countries  for  MPA  III),  the  number  of  really  restricted  countries  may be  far
smaller  because  the  actual  restrictions  are  set  by  the  individual  bilateral
agreement  between  each  exporting  and  importing  country.  The  targets  of  actual
restrictions  are  limited  to  major  T&C  exporting  countries,  and  many  countries,
especially  most  Latin  American  countries,  are  not  restricted  very  much  by  MPA
quotas. As Table  9 shows,  while  the  superstars  of  T&C  exports,  Hong  Kong  and
Korea  1/,  are  severely  restricted  by  the  MPA,  the  restrictions  imposed  on some
of  the  Latin  American  countries  are  far  less  severe.  In  addition,  although
the  quotas  imposed  on  Hong Kong and  Korea  are  almost  filled,  the  utilization
rates  of  Colombia  and  Mexico  are  less  than  50  percent.  Purther,  it  should  be
noted  that  ACP  (African,  Caribbeano  and  Pacific)  countries  are  exempt  from  '.ne
MFA  quotas  imposed  by  the  eC under  the  Lome Convention  while  some  Caribbean
countries  are  exempt  from  the  MFA  quotas  imposed  by  the  US under  newly-adopted
"super  807"  program.  2/
1/ Note  that  Taiwan  (Province  of  China)  is  not  a  member  country  of  the  MPA.
2/  Under  the  new preferential  program  for  the  Caribbean  countries,  often
referred  to  as  "super  807,"  clothing  made  entirely  of  US  materials  can
enter  the  US  without  regard  to  bilateral  MPA  quotas.28
Because  of the  discriminatory  nature  of  the  MPA  quotas,  which  are
very  different  from  global  quotas  permitted  under  GATT  Article  XIX,  it is
often  pointed  out  that  some  developing  countries  actually  benefit  from  the
MPA. For  example,  Cable  (1987)  mentions  that  "some  of the  less  competitive
Latin  American  and  Eastern  European  exporters  saw  the  MFA  as  providing  a
TABLE  10: The  Coverage  and  Utilization  Rate  of  MPA  Quotas
of Selected  Countries
(Z)
MFA  Coverage  Utilization  Rate
Exporters  to US  to EC  to US  to  EC
Hong  Kong  75.7  94.7  100.0  79.0
Kore  76.4  95.1  96.2  89.4
Colombia  40.1  63.5  43.5  35.5
Mexico  45.4  6.4  38.6  9.8
Source: GATT  (1984).
guaranteed  market  share." Similarly,  Wolf  (1987)  pointed  out  that  "any
discriminatory  quotas  allow  unrestricted  exporters  to share  the  benefits  of
protection  with  the  domestic  producers."
There  is some  evidence  of  the  trade  diversion  effect. Keesing  and
Wolf  (1980)  present  data  to  support  such  a trade  diversion  effect  in  earlier
years.  As Table  8  above  shows,  immediately  after  Japan  announced  a  VER on
shipments  to the  United  States,  Hong  Kong  dramatically  increased  shipments  to
fill  the  gap. More  recently,  Volf  (1987)  presented  data  to  support  this29
effect. According  to  him,  in 1981-85,  the  US imports  of  T&C  from  the  Big
Three  (Song  Kong,  Korea,  and  Taiwan  (Province  of China))  have  grown  at  an
annual  rate  of less  than  10  percent,  while  those  from  other  developing
countries  and  from  Europe  have  grown  by 22  percent  and  33 percent,
respectively.
It should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  growth  rate  of the  Big  Three
being  lower  than  that  of  other  developing  countries  does  not  necessarily  mean
that  the  trade  diversion  is  caused  by the  HFA.  It  is quite  possible  that  such
a difference  in  the  growth  rates  results  from  the  shift  in  comparative
advantage  toward  newcomers.  The  SPA  sometimes  discourages  such  a  shift  in
comperative  advantage  because  it  tends  to  maintain  current  distribution  of  T&C
trade  among  developing  countries.  Such  dynamic  effects,  as well  as  trade
diversion  due  to  foreign  investment,  will  be  further  discussed  later  in
section  S-(4)  of the  paper.
(3)  Incentive  for  Upgrading
In  addition  to the  geographical  diversion  mentioned  above,  many
authors  have  argued  that  quantitative  restrictions  like  the  MPA  encourage
production  diversion;  upgrading.  1/ Theoretically,  quantitative  restrictions
like  the  MFA  can  result  in  either  upgrading  or  downgrading,  "depending  on the
shapes  of the  total  costs  and  total  valuations,"  as  Leffler  (1982)  has
rigorously  shown. But,  many  authors  present  arguments  and  supporting  data  in
its  favor.
1/ Peenstra  (1986),  for  example,  presented  an  excellent  study  on the
upgrading  of  the  Japanese  shipment  of  automobiles  under  the  Vea.30
Cline  (1987)  discusses  the  upgrading  effect  as follows:
"Because  the  MPA  controls  the  phys  cal  volume  of imports  rather  than  their
value,  it  introduces  an incentive  to  upgrade  products. In  one  dimension,
this  process  has  occurred  from  a shift  of  textiles.....to  finished
apparel.....  While  controlled  suppliers  have  had  an incentive  to  upgrade
by  moving  up  the  ladder  of processing  stages,  they  have  also  faced  an
inducement  to  upgrade  the  quality  of  their  exports  within  each  product
category.
As evidence  of this  effect,  Cline  presents  data  which  show  that  the  real  value
of imports  grew  more  slowly  than  the  physical  volume  in 1961-72  (before  the
MPA),  while  the  real  value  of imports  grew  considerably  more  rapidly  in  the
initial  years  of  the  MPA  (1972-77).
Similarly,  Wolf  (1987)  argues  as  follows:
"One important  respect  in  which  quantitative  restrictions  are  almost
inevitably  porous  is  that  they  permit  upgrading.  The  principal  reason  for
upgrading  is  that  the  quota  premium,  whether  explicit  or implicit,  acts
like  a specific  tax,  so  having  a greater  proportionate  effect  on lower
valued  than  on  higher  valued  items. This,  in  turn,  would  be  expected  to
shift  both  supply  and  demand  away  from  the  lower  valued  items."
As  evidence,  Wolf  presents  data  which  show  that  in  1981-84,  when  the  US
restrictions  on major  suppliers  of  foreign  T&C  became  stricter,  the  unit  value
of  American  T&C  imports  from  heavily  restricted  countries  like  Hong  Kong,
Korea,  and  Taiwan  (Province  of  China)  increased,  although  those  from  Japan,
Europe  and  most  other  LDCs  declined  due  to  the  appreciation  of the  US  dollar.
Some  cast  a  doubt  on the  above  arguments  for  upgrading.  For  example,
Tarr  and  Morkre  (1984)  argued  that  "over  time  quality  may  improve,  i.e.,  as
technology  advances  and  labor  skills  increase,  in  the  absence  of the
quotas." A quality  improvement  over  time,  particularly  from  the  East  Asian
exporters,  does  not  necessarily  mean  the  upgrading  was  caused  only  by the
quantitative  restrictions.31
Then,  what  kind  of impact  does  upgrading  give  to  developing
countries?  As  Keesing  and  Wolf  (1980)  argued,  developing  countries  could
learn  how  to  export  more  sophisticated  products  through  upgrading  induced  by
the  quantitative  restrictions.  They  argued  as follows:
"`,*,,(upgrading)  may  have  been  very  favourable  for  the  economies'  long-
term  development  compared  with  specializing  in  turning  out  larger
quantities  of cheap  sweaters,  shorts  or slacks. In  addition,  learning  to
get  the  most  Out  of quotas  must  have  been  very  demanding  and  has  probably
greatly  strengthened  entrepreneurship,  management  and  technical
versatility,  especially  in  Hong  Kong,  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  where  quotas
have  had  the  most  restrictive  impact."
In  spite  of the  above  studies,  however,  it  seems  that  further  studies  are
needed  on  whether  the  MPA  significantly  contributed  to  product  upgrading,  and
on  how  such  upgrading,  if  any,  affected  developing  countries.
(4)  Dynamic  Impact  on Economic  Development
The  MPA  has  been  in  effect  for  many  years,  and  there  is  little  hope
for  its  imminent  demise. In  fact,  almost  thirty  years  have  passed  since  the
international  restriction  was  imposed  on  T&C  trade  in 1961. Because  of its
everlasting  nature,  the  MPA  gives  important  dynamic  effects  on  developing
countries  in  the  long  run. Although  very  few,  if  any,  major  studies  are
available  on such  dynamic  effects  of  the  MPA,  some  of the  points  that  should
be studied  will  be discussed  below. Pocus  of the  discussion  will  be  on the
encouragement  of  foreign  direct  investment  and  on  the  discouragement  of  ow
entry.
(i)  Forein Direct  Investment
As Kumar  and  McLeod  (1981)  pointed  out,  the  MPA  encourages  foreign
direct  investment  into  non-restricted  (and  less  restricted)  LDCs. As  major
T&C  exporting  LDCs,  e.g.  Hong  Kong  and  Korea,  came  to  realize  that  the  MPA
restrictions  imposed  on them  would  continue  for  many  years  to  come,  they  tried
to  set  up plants  in  other  countries.  Kumar  and  McLeod  reported  that  T&C  firms32
in  Hong  Kong  made  huge  investments  in  other  Asian  countries,  including  China,
and  that  some  of these  investments  were  made  mainly  "to  circumvent  tariffs  and
quotas  imposed  by developed  countries."  More  recently,  a  lot  of government
officials  and  businessmen  in  Caribbean  countries,  e.g.  Dominican  Republic  and
Jamaica,  pointed  out  that  many  firms  in the  Asian  Big  Three  have  been
investing  to  establish  clothing  factories  in  their  countries,  and  that  without
the  MPA  the  increase  in  such  inflow  of capital  from  Asian  firms  would  have
been  much  slower.  1/
The  incentive  for  such  a  dramatic  increase  in  foreign  direct
investment  from  the  Asian  Big  Three  to  less  restricted  countries  is  probably
twofold. The  first  and  obvious  one  is  that  becuase  of  the  MPA  quotas,  Hong
Kong,  for  example,  has  to set  up plants  in  the  leas  restricted  countries,  if
it  is to  increase  T&C  shipments  to  developed  countries  over  the  quota  level.
Secondly,  the  quota  rent  accrued  to  major  T&C  exporters  seems  to  play  very
important  role  in the  foreign  direct  investment.  As  examined  above,  many
studies  report  that  the  quota  rent  accrued  to  Hong  Kong  is  huge  (i.e.  millions
of  dollars). Because  of  this  huge  quota  rent,  T&C  firms  in  Hong  Kong  etc.  can
earn  handsome  profits,  which  can  be  used  as  a fund  for  the  foreign  direct
investment.
It  should  be noted,  however,  that,  while  the  foreign  direct
investment,  as  well  as technological  transfers,  from  major  T&C  exporters  will
encourage  economic  development  of  host  countries,  the  MPA  tends  to  discourage
host  countries  from  becoming  "too  successful."  As  examined  below,  when
Bangladesh  showed  drmatic success  in  clothing  exports  with  the  help  of a
1/  These  statements  are  based  on the  author's  interviews  with  people  in -he
government  and  private  sectors  during  a  visit  to  the  Dominican  Republic  in
1987.33
Korean company, the  developed  countries  successfully  negotiated  bilateral
restrictions  with the poorer  country.
(ii)  Deterrence to  New Entry
In some sense,  the  MPA tends to  maintain the present  configuration  of
T&C trade,  and therefore,  it  discourages  the dynamic shift in the trade
pattern based on comparative  advantage.  As  the  history of economic
developmeit  of many countries  suggests,  the production  of T&C products  was a
catalyst to industialization. For example,  the dramatic  economic development
of Japan was spurred  by its exports  of silk and cotton  products some  decades
ago.  As Japan accumulated  capital,  and  as the  vage rate  of Japan became
higher, it shifted  toward the production  of more capital intensive  goods, and
Hong Kong (and  Korea) acquired  the comparative  advantage  in T&C production.
As Keesing and Wolf (1980)  argued,  "in the absence  of (NPA) restrictions  on
their suppliers,  shifts toward  new sources  of supply  could  be expected....  If
lMPA  quotas  did not exist, these  countries  (LDCs  other than the  Asian Big
Three) would have the  opportunity  to follow  much the same path to
industrialization  that  Hong Kong, South  Korea  and Taiwan  have been taking,  and
supplant  them as leading clothing  exporters."
But, a longlasting  MPA would  delay the shift  in the place of T&C
production for at least  two reasons.  First,  quota  rent transferred  enables
Hong Kong to maintain international  competitiveness  even after its comparative
advantage in  T&C production  has shifted  toward less  developed  countries.
Namely, because of higher prices  caused  by the scarcity  generated by the
quotas,  Hong Kong can compensate  for the increase  in the real wage rate in the
country.  This would discourage  other less  developed  LEDcs from becoming  major
T&C exporters.34
Secondly,  the  MPA  tends  to  directly  discourage  new T&C  exporters  from
becoming  major  suppliers  because  MPA  quotas  are  imposed  on  even  very  small  and
poor  countries  when  they  begin  to  show  a rapid  increase  in  the  shipment  of  T&C
products.  The  experience  of Bangladesh  in  early  1980s  presents  a typical
example of such  discouragement  by the  MPA. Spinanger  (1987)  reported  a vivid
description  of  the  incident.  As  he  pointed  out,  "Bangladesh  is  one  of the
poorest  and  most  heavily  aided  countries  in  the  world." But,  with  the  help  of
Korea  and  a local  entrepreneur  with  vision,  its  garment  exports  increased  from
almost  nothing  in  1979  to  $500  million  in  1987. But  late  in  1985,  the  US
successfully  negotiated  the  MPA  quota  with  Bangladesh,  and  out  of 700  garment
factories  then  operating,  an  astonishing  300  were shut  down. There  are  a few
other  exmple of  the  imposition  of  the  MPA  quota  on small  and  poor  exporters
which  are  insignificant  in  the  total  T&C  imports  by  developed  countries.  1/
On this  harmful  impact  of  the  MFA  on  economic  development,  Keesing
and  Wolf  (1980)  argued  as  follows:
"...What  are  almost  certainly  the  most  harmful  consequences  of  teztile
quotas  will  come  over  the  long  run,  therefore,  in  relatively  poor
developing  countries  that  have  the  potential  to expand  their  industrial
base  and  manufactured  exports  by specializing  at  first  in labour-intensive
products  such  as  clothing."
The  trade  restriction  is,  in  most  cases,  harmful. But,  as examined  above,  a
longlasting  restriction  like  the  MPA  is  all  the  more  harmful  because  it
discourages  dynamic  change  in  international  division  of  labor.
1/  For  example,  when  the  SC imposed  quota  against  Sri  Lanka  in  1977,  the
share  of  Sri  Lanka  in total  eC imports  of T&C  was  only  0.22  percent.35
6. Concluding  Remarks
Clothing  exports  are  much  more  important  to  the  developing  countries
than  to  developed  countries,  and  the  target  of  the  MFA  is  placed  on low-cost
exports  from  the  LDCs. Although  the  MFA  has  continued  for  ;.ine  time,  and
although  many studies  have  been  made  of it,  most  studies  examine  only  the
effects  of the  MPA  on importing  countries.  In  view  of  the  importance  of the
developing  countries  in  the  world  T&C  trade,  more  studies  are  clearly  needed
on  the  impact,  including  dynamic  impact,  of the  MPA  on  exporting  LDCc.
Almost  all  of  the  few  studies  on the  effect  of the  MFA  on  exporting
LDCs  concern  the  transferred  quota  rent  or  the  change  in  export  values  under
the  MPA  quota  and  they  found  that  the  foregone  exports  and  quota  rents  are
huge. Yet,  it  would  be  naive  to  assume  exporting  countries  (or  firms)  capture
all  of this  quota  rent. Moreover,  the  MPA  is  likely  to  have  much  more  effect
on  LDC  exporters  because  of its  complexity  and  longlasting  nature. In
addition  to  the  immediate  impact  such  as  lost  export  income  due  to  the
quantity  restriction,  the  MPA  has  a  harmful  impact  on the  efforts  of  economic
development  through  the  delay  in  the  shift  in  the  international
competitiveness  in  T&C  exports  toward  poorer  LDCs,  si  discussed  above. In
order  to  fully  understand  the  effect  of the  MFA  on exporting  developing
countries,  many more studies  seem  to  be  needed  on the  dynamic  interaction  of
various  effects.36
Appendix:  Major  provisions  of  the  MPA
Although  the  MPA  has  been  extended  three  times,  such  extensions  were
made  by attaching  new  protocols,  and  the  main  text  of the  MPA  has  remained
intact.
(i)  Stated  Objectives  (Article  1)
The  stated  objectives  of  the  MPA  are
"to  achieve  the  expansion  of  trade,  the  reduction  of  barriers  to  such
trade  and  the  progressive  liberalization  of  world  trade  in  textile
products,  while  at the  same  time  ensuring  the  orderly  and  equitable
development  of this  trade  and  avoidance  of  disruptive  effects  in
individual  markets  and  on individual  lines  of production  in  both  importing
and  exporting  countries."
Import  restrictions  are  supposed  to  be imposed  only  to  avoid  disruptive
effects,  and  the  T&C  industry  in  developed  countries  where  the  industry  has
lost  comparative  advantage  is  supposed  to  adjust  to the  new  trend  either  by
shrinking  or by  regaining  competitiveness.  However,  as  examined  in  the  main
text,  actual  developments  of  T&C  trade  under  the  MPA  are  far  from  the  stated
objectives.
(ii)  Restrictive  measures  (Articles  3  and  4)
The  MFA  provides  that  in  certain  aituations  importing  countries  can
take  unilateral  or  bilaterally-agreed  restrictive  measures  in  order  to  avoid
"disruptive  effects  in  individual  markets  and  on individual  lines  of
production."  Article  3 provides  for  measures  taken  when  actual  market
disruption  occurs  while  Article  4 provides  for  measures  when  only  the  risk  of
market  disruption  exists. While  during  MFA  I,  many  unilateral  measures  were
taken  after  unsuccessful  consultations,  recently  almost  all  restrictions  have37
been  made  under  bilateral  agreements  between  the  importing  and  exporting
countries.
(iii)  Definition  of  Market  Disruption  (Annex  A)
The  determinacion  of a situation  of  market  disruption  must  be  based
on the  existence  of serious  damage  to  domestic  producers  or actual  threat  to
them. Such  damage  must  demonstrably  be  caused  by  the  following  factors:
(a)  a sharp  end  substantial  increase  or iminent increase  of imports  of
particular  sources;
(b)  the  products  being  offered  at  prices  that  are  substantially  below  the
prevailing  price  in  the  importing  country.
The  MPA  does  not  allow  the  importing  country  to take  trade  restrictions  for
damges caused  by "factors  such  as  technological  changes  or  changes  in
consumer  preference.  This,  according  to  the  text  of  the  MPA,  the
determination  of  a situation  as 'market  disruption'  is  fairly  limited,  while,
in  reality,  it  has  been  broadly  interpreted.
(iv)  Requirements  for  Individual  Restrictions  (Annex  B)
In  order  to  protect  the  exporting  country  restricted  by  the  MPA
quota,  the  MPA  stipulates  the  minimum 3tandards  on  the  base  year,  growth  rate
and  flexibility  of  quota,  though  such  standards  are  often  ignored  in
individual  quota  restrictions.
The  MPA  stipulates  that  new  quotas  maust  not  be less  than  actual  trade
levels  during  the  previous  year. In the  case  of  continuing  quotas,  the  annual
growth  rate  should  not  be  less  than  6  percent. However,  in  "exceptional"
circumstances,  when  a  recurrence  or  worsening  of  disruption  is  anticipated,
the  annual  growth  rate  can  be  reduced  below  6  percent.  The  6  percent  growth
rate  is  higher  than  that  under  the  LTA,  where  the  required  annual  growth  rate38
was 5 percent.  As Wolf  (1987)  pointed  out,  "the  6  percent  growth  rate  of
restraint  levels  implies  the  'withering  away'  of  textile  restraints"  because
the  growth  rate  of  6  percent  in  volume  exceeds  the  growth  of  the  market  by  a
substantial  margin.  However, the  actual  growth  rates  of  quota  amount  imposed
on  superstars  has  been  below  6  percent.
Further,  the  MPA  provides  a  certain  flexibility  of  quota
administration.  First,  where  restraint  is  exercised  for  more  than  one
product,  a  particular  quota  can  be  exceeded  by  7  percent  provided  there  is  a
corresponding  reduction  in  another  quota  "swing  provision."  Second,  where
restraints  are  established  for  more  than  one  year,  up  to  10  percent  of  the
unused  portion  of  the  previous  year's  quota  can  be  carried  over,  and  up  to  5
percent  of  next  year's  quota  can  be  carried  forward,  as  long  as  the  combined
use  of  carry  over  and  carry  forward  does  not  exceed  10  percent.39
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